Egemonia

Tanya Reinhart

This is an excerpt from Israel/Palestine- how to end the war of 1948, Seven Stories Press, 2002, 2005, pp. 83-87

It appears that Ehud Barak had one big achievement for which the majority of Israeli society was enthusiastically thankful—he withdrew the Israeli army from Lebanon. Nevertheless, his real intentions for doing that remain a mystery. I quote from a column I wrote in Yediot Aharonot in May 29, 2000, at the time of the withdrawal from Lebanon.

But there are still a few puzzling questions [regarding the withdrawal from Lebanon]. A first wonder—how is it that the border line has not been fortified and prepared? For a year, the government and the army have been discussing the withdrawal from Lebanon and when the moment came, it turned out that all that was done so far is to approve the plans. In most areas, the work will take another year. A second wonder—how is it that there was not even a slight bargaining attempt over the border line, which now passes in the middle of kibbutz Manara's water reserve? There was not even bargaining over areas which were probably held by Israel before 1978… And a third wonder—how is it that the right-wing is not protesting? Sharon seems to be furiously attacking Barak. But over what? Over the fact that Barak didn't deliver harder “preventive blows” to Beirut before the withdrawal. As for the withdrawal itself (to this implausible and unprotected border line)—Sharon is warmly supportive.

It is actually easy to understand Sharon's stand. After all, he is the first who proposed, three years ago, a unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon. By his plan, such a withdrawal will provide Israel with the support of the international community. Under such circumstances,the first slightest incident will be viewed as a legitimate excuse for Israel to attack Lebanon and Syria with devastating blows and return to Lebanon under better conditions. Whoever plans to go back in will not argue over the exact border line and will not invest time and resources in fortifying this border for only a month or two.

But Sharon isn't the one conducting this withdrawal. It is Barak. Then, still, why wasn't the border fortified? There are two options: either there has been a very big goof-up, or Barak is executing, in practice, Sharon's plan. Under the first scenario, Barak is determined to achieve peace, which can explain goof-ups here and there. Although it is Barak who suggested in 1982, in a memo to Sharon, to extend the Lebanon war to a comprehensive war with Syria, he has come to his senses since then. In the second scenario, Barak is the same Barak. Perhaps he believes that it is still possible to realize Ben Gurion's vision according to which control of Southern Lebanon is crucial for the future of Israel. Indeed the [Israeli] public is tired of the price in casualties, but it will soon learn that without Lebanon there cannot be quiet in the north….Then the spoiled public will learn that there is no choice—we have to go back to Lebanon. Yossi Sarid, at least, has been warning for months that the road of unilateral withdrawal is leading, in fact, back into Lebanon.

The problem is that we have no way to know what goes on in Barak's mind, because he doesn't share his plans with others. Democracy or not—Barak is known to be a person who takes his decisions by himself… It is the same Barak who wrote to Sharon at the eve of the Lebanon war in 1982 that it is possible to keep a very small number of confidants who “know the full extent of the plan” ...

Indeed, we cannot know what Barak planned, because an unexpected development interfered. On June 10, 2000, two weeks after Israel completed its withdrawal from Lebanon, Hafez Assad, who ruled in Syria for thirty years, died of a heart failure, and his son Bashir Assad took his place. If an Israeli attack on Syria was planned at the time, it had to be postponed, since there could be no international legitimization for attacking the son for the putative crimes of his father.

But one thing is clear: Barak insisted on keeping a small area of conflict—the Shaba Farms. This is a narrow fourteen-kilometer-long and two-kilometer-wide strip near Mount Dov that Israel insists belonged to Syria, and not to Lebanon, hence it would not withdraw from this strip. (Both Syria and Lebanon deny this and declare the area is Lebanese and should be returned to Lebanon.) Hizbollah continues, as might be expected, to fight over this strip of land, demanding its liberation from Israeli occupation. This remains a source of tension and potential incidents. The story now is that Hizbollah, and Syria backing it, continues to threaten Israeli existence, and a war with Syria may be inevitable. As we shall see in Chapter IX, the Sharon administration is currently talking openly about such a forthcoming war.

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Tanya Reinhart is Professor Emeritus of linguistics and media studies at Tel Aviv University and a frequent op-ed writer for the Israeli evening paper 'Yediot Aharonot'. The second edition of her 2002 book Israel/Palestine - how to end the war of 1948 has appeared last year (Seven Stories), and her new book: The Road Map to Nowhere, will appear in September (Verso).

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[1] Yoav Stern, 'Nasrallah: Only deal will free kidnapped soliders,' Ha'aretz July 13, 2006.
[2] Amos Harel, Aluf Benn and Gideon Alon, 'Gov't okays massive strikes on Lebanon,' Ha'aretz, July 13, 2006.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Amos Har'el, 'Israel prepares for widespread military escalation', Ha'aretz internet edition, Last update - 21:50 12/07/2006.
[5] Amos Harel, Jack Khoury and Nir Hasson, Over 100 Katyushas hit north, Ha'aretz July 14, 2006.
[6]'Lebanese PM to lobby Pres. Bush on Israeli withdrawal from Shaba', by Reuters, Ha'aretz, April 16, 2006 :

"Lebanon's prime minister [is] asking U.S. President George Bush to put pressure on Israel to pull out of a border strip and thus enable his government to extend its authority over all Lebanese land... 'Israel has to withdraw from the Shaba Farms and has to stop violating our airspace and water,' Siniora said. This was essential if the Lebanese government was 'to become the sole monopoly of holding weapons in the country'.., he added. 'Very important as well is to seek the support of President Bush so that Lebanon will not become in any way a ball in the courtyard of others or... a courtyard for the confrontations of others in the region,' Siniora said. Lebanon's rival leaders are engaged in a 'national dialogue' aimed at resolving the country's political crisis, the worst since the end of the 1975-1990 civil war. One key issue is the disarming of Hezbollah... The Shi'ite Muslim group says its weapons are still required to liberate Shaba Farms and to defend Lebanon against any Israeli threats."

[7] Amos Harel, Aluf Benn and Gideon Alon, 'Gov't okays massive strikes on Lebanon', Ha'aretz, July 13, 2006.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Robin Wright, 'Strikes Are Called Part of Broad Strategy', Washington Post, Sunday, July 16, 2006; A15.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Tanya Reinhart Israel-Palestine - how to end the war of 1948, Seven Stories press 2002, 2005, p. 83-87.
See 'How Israel left Lebanon' http://www.tau.ac.il/~reinhart (Media articles section, as of Thursday).